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TWU Law: A Reply to Proponents of
Approval

Trinity Western University has a Community Covenant that only permits sexual
minorities to attend at considerable personal cost to their dignity and sense
of self-worth. All student and staff applicants to TWU are required to sign this
covenant, pledging not to engage in same-sex intimacy. The purpose of this
article is to offer a reply to the arguments advanced by proponents of granting
law society accreditation to TWU’s proposed program. The paper rejects six of
the central claims that proponents of approval have advanced. First it responds to
the claim that TWU does not actually discriminate against the LGBTQ community.
Second it speaks to the assertion that the Community Covenant represents a
voluntary choice not to engage in same-sex sexual intimacy. Third it rejects the
contention that TWU welcomes gay and lesbian students. Fourth it challenges the
distinction TWU supporters draw between a code of conduct that prohibits samesex intimacy and a policy that excludes gays and lesbians. Fifth it rejects the
proposition, broadly accepted by the Benchers of the Law Society of BC, that the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in BCCT is dispositive of the issue faced by
law societies today. Sixth, it rejects the claim that opposition to public accreditation
of TWU can be equated with opposition to a Christian worldview or the desirability
of a faith-based university. The final section of the paper argues that the decision
in some provinces not to accredit TWU’s law degree is reasonable and will be
respected by reviewing courts.
Il existe, à l’Université Trinity Western, un document appelé Community Covenant
qui énonce des normes communautaires n’autorisant les minorités sexuelles à
fréquenter l’Université qu’à un coût personnel considérable pour leur dignité
et leur estime de soi. Toutes les personnes qui souhaitent étudier ou travailler
à l’Université doivent signer ce document et s’engager à ne pas avoir de
rapports sexuels avec des personnes du même sexe. Cet article a pour objectif
de répliquer aux arguments avancés par ceux et celles qui souhaitent que
l’accréditation du barreau soit octroyée au programme proposé par l’Université.
L’auteure réfute six des arguments fondamentaux avancés par les partisans de
l’approbation. Premièrement, elle répond à l’allégation que l’Université ne fait
aucune discrimination à l’égard de la communauté LGBTQ. Deuxièmement,
elle réfute la prétention que le Community Covenant est une décision volontaire
de ne pas s’adonner à des actes sexuels avec des personnes du même sexe.
Troisièmement, elle rejette la prétention que l’Université est accueillante pour
les étudiants gays et lesbiennes. Quatrièmement, elle conteste la distinction
que font les partisans de l’Université entre un code de conduite qui interdit les
actes sexuels entre personnes du même sexe et une politique qui exclut gays
et lesbiennes. Cinquièmement, elle réfute la prétention, largement acceptée par
les conseillers du Barreau de la C.-B., que l’arrêt de la Cour suprême du Canada
dans BCCT dispose de la question à laquelle font face les barreaux aujourd’hui.
Sixièmement, elle réfute l’allégation que l’opposition à l’accréditation publique de
l’Université peut être assimilée à l’opposition à une vue chrétienne du monde ou
au caractère souhaitable d’une université confessionnelle. Dans la dernière partie
de l’article, l’auteure avance que la décision dans certaines provinces de ne pas
reconnaître le diplôme en droit de l’Université Trinity Western est raisonnable et
sera respecté par les tribunaux qui l’étudieront.
*
Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University. Thank you to Dianne
Pothier, Clay Ruby, Amy Sakalauskas and Jocelyn Downie for comments on previous drafts. Thank
you to Ashley Green for research assistance. An abbreviated and earlier version of some of the
arguments advanced in this article was made in written submissions to the Law Society of Upper
Canada, the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society and the Law Society of British Columbia.
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Introduction
I.
TWU discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation (and sex and
marital status)
II. TWU’s prohibition on same-sex intimacy is neither silly nor voluntary
III. TWU does not welcome sexual minorities
IV. A code of conduct that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy excludes
gays and lesbians
V. The majority decision in BCCT is not dispositive
VI. Opposition to TWU’s law school should not be dismissed as antiChristian
VII. The decisions of the LSUC and the NSBS not to approve TWU were
reasonable
Conclusion

Introduction
In his thoughtful exploration of the British Columbia legal profession’s
historical record of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, political belief,
and ethnic origin, Wesley Pue writes of the twentieth century: “Only the
crudest, earliest, and most obvious of these [discriminatory] obstacles
involved a formal policy of exclusion….”1 The Law Society of British
Columbia is not known for its history of inclusivity. When it—along with
the Faculty of Law at the University of British Columbia (UBC)—excluded
Kew Dock Yip from admission, it denied access to the practice of law to
a man who became a Canadian hero.2 In legal circles Kew Dock Yip was
perhaps most well known for his role in bringing about the repeal of the
federal government’s Chinese Exclusion Act.3 Mr. Yip, the first lawyer in
Canada of Chinese descent, is among Osgoode Hall Law School’s most

1.
W Wesley Pue, Law School: The Story of Legal Education in British Columbia (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, 1995) at Ch 9.
2.
Bill Gladstone, “Obits: Kew Dock Yip (1906−2001) & Irving Himel (1915−2001)” (25 October
2011), online: Bill Gladstone <http://www.billgladstone.ca/?p=3696>.
3.
The Chinese Immigration Act 1923 excluded almost all-Chinese immigrants form landing in
Canada. It was not repealed until 1947. University of British Columbia, The Chinese Experience in
British Columbia: 1850−1950 (nd), online: UBC <http://www.library.ubc.ca/chineseinbc/exclusion.
html>.
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celebrated graduates.4 He spent his legal career practicing in Toronto,
where for many years he was the only Chinese-speaking lawyer in town.5
Despite his later connection to Toronto, Kew Dock Yip was born and
raised in Vancouver.6 Mr. Yip was an Osgoode Hall alumnus because in
1942, when he was seeking admission to law school, the Faculty of Law
at UBC did not accept students of Chinese descent on the basis that the
Law Society of British Columbia expressly excluded Chinese Canadians.7
On 11 April 2014, the Law Society of British Columbia accredited a
law degree program from a university with a formal policy of exclusion
on the basis of sexual orientation.8 Later that month, the Law Society
of Upper Canada and the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society refused to
approve that same program because of concerns regarding the institution’s
discriminatory admissions policy.9 During law society deliberations in
Ontario on the issue of accreditation of this proposed law school, Bencher
Avvy Yao-Yao Go invoked Kew Dock Yip’s legacy.10
The law degree approved by the LSBC is to be offered by Trinity
Western University (TWU). TWU imposes admissions and hiring policies,
through its mandatory Community Covenant, that exclude members of

4.
Law Society of Upper Canada [LSUC], Diversifying The Bar: Lawyers Make History (May
2011), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/PDC/Archives/Diversifying-the-Bar/Diversifying-thebar-Bios-by-Call-from-1941/>. In honour of his 47 years of exemplary service to his community, Mr.
Yip was awarded the Law Society of Upper Canada medal in 1998.
5.
Constance Backhouse, Colour Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900−1950
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
6.
Road to Justice, Kew Dock Yip, online: Road to Justice <http://www.roadtojustice.ca/firstlawyers/kew-dock-yip>.
7.
Ibid. Mr. Yip was initially refused the right to write the bar exams in Ontario but persevered and
joined the Law Society of Upper Canada in 1945.
8.
Law Society of British Columbia [LSBC], “Bencher Meeting Consideration of TWU” (11
April 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3891&t=Bencher-meetingconsideration-of-TWU,-April-11,-2014>.
9.
LSUC, “Trinity Western University Accreditation,” (April 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.
lsuc.on.ca/twu/#statement>; Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society [NSBS], “Council votes for Option C
in Trinity Western University Law School Decision,” (April 2014), online: NSBS <http://nsbs.org/
news/2014/04/council-votes-option-c-trinity-western-university-law-school-decision>. The LSUC
refused to accredit Trinity Western University’s proposed law degree program. The NSBS offered
TWU approval conditional on removing the discriminatory policy. Throughout this article the terms
approval and accreditation are used interchangeably. The rules of each law society are different. Some,
such as those in Nova Scotia, refer to approval of proposed law degree programs. Others, such as
Ontario’s by-laws, refer to the LSUC’s authority to accredit law degree programs.
10. See oral submissions of LSUC Bencher Avvy Yao-Yao Go: Law Society of Upper Canada,
“Convocation: Public Session,” (10 April 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/
ConvocationTranscriptApr102014TWU.pdf > at page 90.
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the LGBTQ community.11 All student and staff applicants to TWU are
required to sign a code of conduct pledging not to engage in same-sex
intimacy.12 As the Supreme Court of Canada concluded in Trinity Western
v. British Columbia College of Teachers, TWU’s mandatory Community
Covenant perpetuates “unfavourable differential treatment” on the basis
of sexual orientation and gay and lesbian individuals could only attend
or work at the university at “considerable personal cost.”13 Despite its
policy, TWU has been granted authority to confer law degrees by the
government of British Columbia.14 TWU has also sought to have its law
school approved by each of the individual law societies in Canada. This
would allow TWU’s law graduates to gain admission to the bar in each of
the provinces through the same process as students from other Canadian
law schools.
The Federation of Law Societies of Canada (Federation), an umbrella
organization that performs administrative functions for the law societies
across Canada, is charged with reviewing proposed new law degree
programs and making recommendations to the law societies regarding
accreditation.15 In response to concerns about TWU’s proposed law
11. Trinity Western University [TWU], Community Covenant Agreement: Our Pledge to One
Another (nd), online: TWU <http://twu.ca/ studenthandbook/twu-community-covenant-agreement.
pdf> [Covenant Agreement]. For a discussion of TWU’s Community Covenant see Section 1. Pue’s
observation that the discriminatory obstacles to the legal profession were layered and insidious and
that only the earliest and crudest of these involved policies of formal discrimination is noteworthy.
Some commentators have criticized opponents of accreditation of TWU (myself included) on the basis
that inequality and discrimination is to be found in every Canadian law school and it is ill advised to
single out TWU. See, e.g., Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, “Legal Education, Religious and
Secular: TWU and Beyond” (2014) Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper Series WP 2014-06, online:
SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2428207>. While this observation about
the systemic and substantive inequality that pervades legal education in Canada is a critical one, its role
in the debate regarding TWU is questionable. TWU, unlike every fully accredited law school in this
country, has an institutional policy of formal discrimination. Unfortunately, the argument advanced by
critics such as Mathen and Plaxton obfuscates the distinction between substantive inequality and its
most obvious and crude progenitor—formal discrimination. This is certainly not to suggest that formal
discrimination is worse, but it is more obvious.
12. TWU community members are required to pledge that they will abstain from “sexual intimacy
that violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a woman.” Covenant Agreement, supra
note 11 at 3.
13. Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31 at 34, 25,
[2001] 1 SCR 772 [BCCT].
14. See 18 December 2013 announcement of Advanced Education Minister: Government of British
Columbia, “Statement on Trinity Western University’s Proposed Law Degree” (18 December 2013),
online: Government of BC Newsroom <http://www.newsroom.gov.bc.ca/2013/12/statement-ontrinity-western-universitys-proposed-law-degree.html>. This decision is now the subject of a legal
challenge in Petition of Loke v Minister of Advanced Education, British Columbia Supreme Court
(2014), online: Ruby Shiller Chan Hasan Barristers <http://www.rubyshiller.com/court-documents/
Loke%20v.%20Minister%20-%20Petition.pdf>.
15. See Federation of Law Societies of Canada [FLSC], “About Us,” online: FLSC <http://www.
flsc.ca/en/about-us/>.
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school, and prior to making its recommendation to the law societies, the
Federation established a Special Advisory Committee (SAC) to examine
and provide the Federation with advice about TWU’s requirement that
all students, staff and faculty of TWU agree to abide by the Community
Covenant as a condition of admission, study and employment. The SAC
issued a final report to the Federation in December 2013 advising that in its
estimation there would be no public interest reasons for the law societies
to exclude future graduates of the program if the Federation’s Approval
Committee were to conclude that TWU’s proposal complies with the
National Requirement.16 The Federation recommended to the law societies
that TWU be accredited. Some law societies, such as Saskatchewan and
Alberta, have simply accepted the Federation’s recommendation.17 British
Columbia, as noted above, engaged in its own debate, in which it decided
to accept the Federation’s recommendation. In an extraordinary response,
lawyers in British Columbia compelled their benchers to hold a special
general meeting of the membership at which a significant majority of
attendees voted in favour of a resolution directing the law society to reverse
its decision.18 Other law societies, for example, those in Nova Scotia and
Ontario, have refused to approve TWU’s program and still others, such as
Newfoundland and Labrador and Manitoba, have yet to decide. TWU has
16. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Special Advisory Committee on Trinity Western’s
Proposed School of Law: Final Report (December 2013), online: FLSC <http://www.flsc.ca/_
documents/SpecialAdvisoryReportFinal.pdf> [SAC Report]; Federation of Law Societies of Canada,
Canadian Common Law Program Approval Committee: Report On Trinity Western University’s
Proposed School Of Law Program (December 2013), online: FLSC <http://www.flsc.ca/_documents/
ApprovalCommitteeFINAL.pdf > [FLSC Final Report]. Given that the SAC was a subcommittee
of the Federation and that the Federation appears to have adopted the SAC position as its own, the
reasoning, conclusions and recommendations drawn by the SAC should be attributed to the Federation
as a whole. In this article the SAC and Federation will be used interchangeably.
17. See Law Society of Alberta [LSAB], Bulletin (14 January 2014), online: LSAB <http://
www.lawsociety.ab.ca/docs/default-source/default-document-library/2014/ebulletins/
bulletin_2014_01jan_14.htm?sfvrsn=2>.
18. The vote was 3,210 in favour, 968 opposed. See Law Society of British Columbia, “Resolution
Adopted at Law Society’s Special General Meeting” (10 June 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.
lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3926&t=Resolution-adopted-at-Law-Society’s-special-generalmeeting> [LSBC Resolution]. As a result of the resolution, on 26 September 2014 the LSBC
reconsidered its decision to approve TWU. At that meeting a motion was passed to conduct a binding
referendum allowing all members of the LSBC to vote on whether to implement a resolution declaring
that the proposed TWU law school is not an approved faculty of law for the purpose of the LSBC’s
admission program. See “Law Society to hold member referendum on accreditation of TWU,” online:
The Law Society of British Columbia <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3975&t=LawSociety-to-hold-member-referendum-on-accreditation-of-TWU>. A similar set of events has occurred
in New Brunswick in response to the Law Society of New Brunswick’s decision to approve TWU.
On 13 September 2014 at a Special General Meeting, members of the LSNB passed a resolution
directing their Council not to approve TWU. The Council of the LSNB has indicated that it will
consider whether to adopt the resolution. See “Law Society Deals With TWU Issue,” online: Law
Society of New Brunswick <http://lawsociety-barreau.nb.ca/uploads/SGM_PR.pdf>.
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initiated legal proceedings to challenge the decisions in Ontario and Nova
Scotia.19
The decision to grant or refuse public accreditation of TWU’s proposed
law degree has produced significant controversy both within and beyond
the legal profession.20 Both proponents and opponents of approval have
offered legal and policy based arguments in favour of their positions.21 In
“The Case for the Federation of Law Societies Rejecting Trinity Western
University’s Proposed Law Degree Program” I advanced an analysis that
opposed approval by Canada’s law societies of TWU’s proposal.22 Since
that article was published the debate has progressed and become more
focussed: the Federation, the LSBC and the LSUC have obtained legal
opinions23; at least four law societies have engaged in public consultation
processes involving voluminous written and oral submissions24; and the

19. See Trinity Western University, “Trinity Western University takes legal action to defend religious
freedom” (6 May 2014), online: TWU <http://www.twu.ca/news/2014/028-twu-takes-legal-action.
html>.
20. See, e.g., submissions to: the Law Society of British Columbia, “TWU Submissions” (nd),
online: LSBC Submissions <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-submissions.pdf>
[LSUC Submissions]; Law Society of Upper Canada, “Trinity Western University Accreditation”
(April 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/twu/#statement> [LSUC Submissions]; Nova
Scotia Barristers’ Society, “TWU submissions” (nd), online: NSBS <http://nsbs.org/twu-submissions>
[NSBS Submissions]. For media coverage see, e.g., Stephane Erikson, “Trinity Western Law School
Has No Right To Judge Its Gay Students,” The Globe and Mail (21 February 2014), online: The Globe
and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/by-what-authority-does-trinitywestern-judge-its-students/article16861242/>; John G Stackhouse, “Have Some Faith In Christian
Law School,” The Globe and Mail (3 February 2014), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.
theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/have-some-faith-in-christian-law-school/article16661053/>.
21. Ibid.
22. Elaine Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU Law School of Law Societies Rejecting Trinity
Western University’s Proposed Law Degree Program” (2013) 25:1 CJWL 148, online: SSRN <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2202408> [The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed
Law School].
23. See, e.g., Legal Opinion of John Laskin in SAC Report, supra note 16 at Appendix C; Legal
Opinion of Geoffrey Gomery in LSBC, “TWU Material” (8 May 2013), online: LSBC <http://www.
lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-material.pdf> at page 9 [Gomery Opinion]; Legal Opinion
of Mohammed Jamal to Elliot Spears in LSUC (5 April 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.
on.ca/uploadedFiles/IssuesCanadianCharterRightsFreedoms.pdf> [Jamal Opinion]; Legal Opinion
of Andrew Pinto to Elliot Spears in LSUC (7 April 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
uploadedFiles/IssuesOntarioHumanRightsCode.pdf> [Pinto Opinion].
24. See LSBC Submissions, supra note 20; LSUC Submissions, supra note 20; NSBS Submissions,
supra note 20 and submissions to the Law Society of New Brunswick [LSNB], “TWU Submissions”
(as of 30 April 2014), online: LSNB <http://www.lawsociety-barreau.nb.ca/files/TWU/Submissions_
FINAL.pdf>.
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first round of law society decisions has been made.25 The Federation,
as well as many of those who made submissions to the law societies
in Ontario, Nova Scotia and British Columbia, engaged explicitly with
the arguments I developed in that article.26 Several of the legal opinions
obtained by the law societies in Ontario and British Columbia responded
specifically to my arguments.27 The purpose of this essay is threefold: first,
to offer a reply to those proponents of granting law society accreditation
to TWU’s proposed program that addressed the arguments I advanced
in “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School”; second, to
respond to the main arguments that TWU and others have advanced since
I published “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School”; and
third, to demonstrate that the decisions of the LSUC and the NSBS were
reasonable, proportionate and just and should be upheld by reviewing
courts.
The remainder of this article is divided into seven sections, each
intended to respond to an argument that has been advanced in favour of
law society accreditation of TWU’s law school. The first section responds
to the claim that TWU does not actually discriminate against the LGBTQ
community. The second speaks to the assertion that the Community
Covenant represents a voluntary choice not to engage in same-sex sexual
intimacy. This section also addresses attempts to trivialize the impact of
the Community Covenant. Following this is a rejection, in section three,
of TWU’s contention that it welcomes gay and lesbian students. Section
four challenges the distinction TWU supporters draw between a code of
conduct that prohibits same-sex intimacy and a policy that excludes gays
and lesbians. Section five rejects the proposition that the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in BCCT is dispositive of the issue faced by law societies
today. Increased legal recognition of the equality interests of sexual
minorities will inform what constitutes a reasonable and proportionate
balance between equality and freedom of religion. Section six rejects the
claim that opposition to public accreditation of TWU can be equated with
opposition to a Christian worldview or the desirability of a faith-based

25. FLSC Final Report, supra note 16; LSUC Submissions, supra note 20; Nova Scotia Barristers’
Society, “Council Votes For Option C In Trinity Western University Law School Decision” (April 2014),
online: NSBS <http://nsbs.org/news/2014/04/council-votes-option-c-trinity-western-university-lawschool-decision>; Law Society of British Columbia, “Bencher Meeting Consideration of TWU” (11
April 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3891&t=Bencher-meetingconsideration-of-TWU,-April-11,-2014>.
26. See, e.g., SAC Report, supra note 16.
27. See for example the Laskin Opinion in SAC Report, supra note 16; Gomery Opinion, supra note
23; Jamal Opinion, supra note 23.
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university. Lastly, section seven argues that the decisions of the LSUC
and the NSBS were reasonable and will be respected by reviewing courts.
TWU discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation (and sex and
marital status28)
Trinity Western University requires its students and staff to sign a
contract committing themselves not to engage in same-sex sexual
intimacy because it is—in the words the university has chosen—“vile”
and “shameful.”29 Despite this policy, representatives of TWU have stated
that they do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and the
Federation appears to have accepted this assertion.30 TWU has asserted a
commitment to principles of equality and non-discrimination with respect
to gays and lesbians.31 In addition to being contrary to the prohibition in its
Community Covenant, these assertions are inconsistent with both TWU’s
non-discrimination policy and with its current and historic response to the
issue of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
First, as I noted in “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law
School,” sexual orientation is conspicuously absent from the lengthy list
of grounds upon which TWU declares itself not to discriminate.32 Sexual
orientation is the only prohibited ground of discrimination under British
Columbia’s human rights legislation, other than religion, that is not
I.

28. The focus of this article is on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However,
TWU’s Covenant also discriminates on the basis of sex (by prohibiting abortion) and marital status
(by prohibiting sexual intimacy between unmarried heterosexuals). See Letter from Janine Benedet,
Director, Centre for Feminist Legal Studies, UBC, to Timothy McGee, Executive Director, Law
Society of British Columbia (24 February 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/
newsroom/TWU-submissions.pdf> (arguing that the TWU Covenant shames women who seek
abortion). See also the Legal Opinion of Andrew Pinto, supra note 23 (noting that the Community
Covenant appears to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, sex, and marital status).
29. As noted, TWU will not hire you nor will it admit you as a student unless you sign a covenant
promising not to engage in “sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage between a
man and a woman.” Covenant Agreement, supra note 11. In support of this covenant TWU cites the
following:
Romans 1:26: For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even their women
did change the natural use into that which is against nature.
Romans 1:27: In the same way the men also abandoned natural relations with women and
were inflamed with lust for one another. Men committed shameful acts with other men, and
received in themselves the due penalty for their error.
30. Letter from Robert Kuhn, President of TWU, to Rene Gallant, President of the NSBS (23 April
2014), online: NSBS <http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-04-23_Kuhn_
TWU.pdf>; Robert G Kuhn, “TWU Has Played By The Rules” National Magazine (28 January 2014),
online: The Canadian Bar Association <http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/January-2014/
TWU-has-played-by-the-rules.aspx>. SAC Report, supra note 16.
31. Letter from TWU President Raymond to Federation of Law Societies of Canada (17 May 2013)
in SAC Report, supra note 16 at Appendix A.
32. TWU, “Employment Opportunities,” online: TWU <https://twu.ca/divisions/hr/join/>
[Employment Opportunities].
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protected by TWU’s anti-discrimination policy.33 This absence should not
be overlooked.
Second, TWU’s response both in the 1990s when the British Columbia
College of Teachers raised concerns with the Covenant, and again in the
current context, is not consistent with a commitment to equality for gays
and lesbians.34 In both instances TWU’s response was to argue vociferously
that the teaching profession and the legal profession should not be permitted
to even consider whether TWU’s policy raises public interest concerns
regarding discrimination against gays and lesbians.35 The Supreme Court
of Canada rightly rejected TWU’s view on this issue.36 Taking the position
that those charged with stewarding the profession of public school teachers
or licensing and regulating lawyers should not be allowed to even consider
issues of discrimination in fulfilling their responsibilities does not reveal
a commitment to non-discrimination. The institutional autonomy of a
university that seeks to provide accredited professional programs is simply
not as extensive as would be the institutional autonomy of a church.
Before accrediting, professional regulators must be permitted to consider
institutional policies that discriminate. The most recent example of TWU’s
resistance to equality protections for gays and lesbians can be found in
its vocal (and unsuccessful) opposition to the 2014 anti-discrimination
resolution passed by the membership of the Canadian Bar Association.37
Many of the arguments urging the Federation and individual law
societies in Canada not to approve TWU’s program stem from the
proposition that it is not in the public interest to approve an institution that

33. Elaine Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School,” supra note 22 at 162. This
is not to suggest that TWU does not discriminate on grounds such as marital status or sex. Rather it
is to note the significance of adopting a non-discrimination policy with an extensive list of prohibited
grounds that does not include sexual orientation.
34. SAC Report, supra note 16. See BCCT, supra note 13.
35. See Letter from TWU President Raymond to Federation of Law Societies of Canada (24 April
2013) in SAC Report, supra note 16 at Appendix A; Letter from TWU President Bob Kuhn to NSBS (7
January 2014), online: NSBS <http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-01-07_
Kuhn_TWU.pdf>.
36. BCCT, supra note 13.
37. Open Letter from Bob Kuhn, TWU President, to the Canadian Bar Association, BC Branch
(18 February 2014), online: Trinity Western University <http://www.twu.ca/academics/school-of-law/
news/2014/075-open-letter-cba-bc.html>.
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discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.38 As was recently noted by
the Advocates’ Society:
The Covenant’s institutionalization of discrimination at TWU manifests
itself in two distinct ways: restricting admission to straight applicants
and/or policing and controlling intimate behavior of those who are
admitted….It should be apparent to all that the Covenant creates a
significant personal cost to individuals.39

This significant cost was not apparent to the Federation. Rather, the
Federation’s SAC Report concluded that TWU’s Covenant does not restrict
admission to heterosexuals and is not contrary to human rights values.40
It is true that in BCCT the Supreme Court of Canada accepted,
without deciding, that section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
did not apply to TWU in that case.41 The Court also accepted that an
exemption under British Columbia’s human rights legislation permits
religious organizations to prefer religious adherents.42 The Court did not
make a finding of non-discrimination. Nor did it find that the exemption
under British Columbia’s laws allows TWU to exclude based on sexual
orientation.43 However, the Court did conclude that TWU’s policy
perpetuates “unfavourable differential treatment” on the basis of sexual
orientation and that gay and lesbian students could only attend TWU at
“considerable personal cost.”44 These are the very phrases that the Supreme
Court of Canada has used to identify and define discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in other decisions.45
In an effort to minimize the impact of the Covenant, some supporters of
TWU have implied that significance should be attributed to the distinction
in wording between the version of the code of conduct at issue in BCCT
and the version that is currently used.46 The previous version has been
characterized as more forcefully worded—presumably intended to imply
38. See, e.g., Elaine Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School,” supra
note 22; Letter from the Advocates’ Society to Thomas Conway, Treasurer, Law Society
of Upper Canada (29 March 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/
TWUTheAdvocates’SocietyMarch28.pdf>; Letter from the Association of Chinese Canadian Lawyers
of Ontario to Jim Varro, Director of Policy, LSUC (20 March 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.
on.ca/uploadedFiles/TWUAssociationofChineseCanadianLawyersofOntarioMarch20.pdf>.
39. Letter from the Advocates’ Society, ibid at page 5.
40. SAC Report, supra note 16.
41. BCCT, supra note 13 at para 25.
42. Ibid at para 35.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid at paras 34, 25.
45. See, e.g., Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513 at 528, 124 DLR (4th) 609. See also M v H [1999]
2 SCR 3 at para 64 [M&H].
46. Gomery Opinion, supra note 23. See also the SAC Report, supra note 16.
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that it was more problematic.47 Not only is the practical effect of today’s
Covenant the same as that of its previous incarnation—a prohibition on
same-sex sexual intimacy—but the suggestion that it is less forceful in
its condemnation of gay sex is not convincing. The previous version
identified homosexuality as biblically condemned.48 The current version
prohibits same-sex intimacy and cites in support of this prohibition biblical
passages that characterize same-sex intimacy as “vile” and “shameful.”49
The Federation misconstrued the Court’s conclusions in BCCT. The
Federation’s SAC Report makes no mention of the Court’s conclusion that
TWU’s policy perpetuates unfavourable differential treatment on the basis
of sexual orientation. The SAC report does not include reference to the
Court’s finding that it would only be at considerable personal cost that a
gay or lesbian student could attend TWU. Instead, the Federation, through
its adoption of the SAC Report, asserts that there is nothing to suggest that
TWU’s covenant limits access to the university by LGBT individuals.50
The Federation did not recognize the considerable personal cost and the
unfavourable differential treatment imposed on LGBT individuals as a limit
on admission to TWU’s proposed law school. Rather than recognizing this
limit, and the considerable dignity interest that underpins it, the Federation
significantly understates the Covenant’s impact on LGBT individuals by
concluding that gay and lesbians students would merely “feel unwelcome”
at TWU.51
The Federation’s incomplete treatment of the Court’s findings in BCCT
gives the misperception that the Court in BCCT held that TWU’s policies
do not discriminate. This is an inaccurate characterization of the Court’s
reasoning. A proper interpretation of the reasoning in BCCT reveals that
the Court did in fact find that TWU discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation.
II. TWU’s prohibition on same-sex intimacy is neither silly nor
voluntary
Many of those who have argued in favour of approving TWU’s proposed
law degree have denigrated or trivialized the Community Covenant.
For example, TWU’s Covenant has been referred to by proponents of

47. Gomery Opinion, supra note 23, SAC Report, supra note 16 at 39.
48. BCCT, supra note 13.
49. Covenant Agreement, supra note 11, citing The Bible: New International Version, online: Bible
Gateway <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans+1%3A26-27> at Romans 1:26
and 1:27.
50. SAC Report, supra note 16 at para 53.
51. Ibid at para 36.
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accreditation and approval as “a silly project.”52 Supporters of approval
have submitted that TWU has “very stupid and very silly beliefs.”53
Two interrelated points should be made in response to submissions of
this nature.
First, it contributes nothing to what is an important and hotly
contested issue to disparage the sincerely held religious beliefs of
members of the TWU community. The debate over accreditation is
not well served by characterizing TWU’s beliefs as stupid and silly
(or by describing the Covenant as disgusting, as others both in favour
and opposed to approval have done54). Of significance to the issue of
approval is the impact on sexual minorities perpetuated by a public
institution that accredits or approves a university with a formal policy
that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy. The faith-based community
at TWU espouses, through its Community Covenant, a profound,
deeply held belief that sexual activity between two men or two women
is wrong.55 TWU argues that this prohibition on same-sex sexual
intimacy is fundamental to TWU’s community.56 Whether this belief
is stupid is not relevant to the decisions of the law societies. It is the
actions taken by the university in furtherance of this deeply held belief
that raise concerns regarding accreditation of its proposed law degree.
This leads to the second point. There is nothing silly about the
potential impact on the LGBTQ community and on individual sexual
minorities perpetuated by the public sanctioning of a university that
explicitly and formally discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.
To dismiss this conviction as silly (presumably done in an effort to
minimize its potential impact on sexual minorities or to distance
oneself from its homophobic message), while at the same time asserting
the profound and fundamental importance of this religious belief for
TWU, seems insincere.

52. Letter from Kevin Kindred to the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (28 January 2014), online:
NSBS <http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-01-28_Kindred_TWU.
pdf>.
53. Letter from Gavin Giles, QC, to the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (22 April 2014),
online:
NSBS
<http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-04-22_
GilesTWUSubmissionToCouncil.pdf>.
54. See LSBC submisisons, supra note 20; LSUC, supra note 20; NSBS Submissions, supra
note 20.
55. Covenant Agreement, supra note 11.
56. Contradictorily, TWU follows this assertion with a complaint that too much attention has
been paid to this one aspect of the Community Covenant. See Trinity Western University, “Reply
Submissions to LSUC” (22 April 2014), online: LUSC at paras 141, 146 <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
uploadedFiles/TWUsubmission-replytoLSUC.pdf >.

TWU Law: A Reply to Proponents of Approval

633

Lastly, the Covenant is not optional. Indeed, any suggestion that TWU’s
Community Covenant is voluntary and non-binding—that “[p]rospective
members are [merely] invited to ‘sincerely embrace’ [it]”57—is without
foundation. TWU’s Community Covenant is not a guideline or invitation
to abstain from same-sex intimacy. It is a covenant—a formal arrangement
that all staff and students must sign in order to work at, or attend, this
university. TWU describes it as a “contractual agreement” that all members
of the university must enter into before joining the “TWU community.”58
The assertion that TWU should be accredited because the Covenant is
voluntary is another way of saying that gays and lesbians who cannot or
will not sign the Covenant can go elsewhere. The argument that gays and
lesbians can simply go elsewhere to become lawyers is problematic. As
TWU noted in its effort to demonstrate to the BC government that there
is a need for more law schools in the province: “Canada has the lowest
number of law schools per capita of any Commonwealth country….
[Applications] currently vastly outnumber the spaces available.”59 Law
school seats are a finite public good. Some LGBTQ students may not have
the option to attend another Canadian law school. Moreover, as a matter
of equality, meaningful access to a legal education in Canada should not
differ depending on a student’s sexual orientation.

57. Faisal Bhabha, “Let TWU Have Its Law School” Slaw (24 January 2014), online: Slaw <http://
www.slaw.ca/2014/01/24/let-twu-have-its-law-school/>. For other submissions characterizing the
Covenant as voluntary see Letter from the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to Tim
McGee, Executive Director, Law Society of British Columbia (2 March 2014), online: BCCLA
<http://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/20140302-Submission-Law-Society-re-TWU.pdf> at
Transcript page 2; Oral submissions by LSBC Bencher Martin Finch, QC, Law Society of British
Columbia, “Bencher Meeting” (11 April 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/
newsroom/TWU-transcript.pdf> at 28:15: “The subject covenant is a voluntary one that is undertaken
by TWU students. Participation in the TWU academic community is a matter choice.” See also Dwight
Newman, “On the Trinity Western University Controversy: An Argument for a Christian Law School
in Canada” (2013) 22:3 Constitutional Forum 1 at 7, where he characterizes the Community Covenant
as a “perspective” or “discussion” asserting: “the public gatekeeper role of the legal profession cannot
properly be used to exclude from the legal profession those who have dared to discuss different
perspectives on the law[.]” This is a misleading characterization of the Covenant both in terms of
its impact and the text itself. The question is whether the “public gatekeeper” to the legal profession
should refuse to approve a law school with a policy that excludes gays and lesbians.
58. Community Covenant, supra note 11.
59. Trinity Western Office of the Provost, “Program Proposal: Juris Doctor” 29 April 2012 as
cited by Letter from Kathleen Lahey to Policy Secretariate, online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
uploadedFiles/TWULahey,KathleenMarch28.pdf>. The Court in BCCT placed emphasis on the
proposition that gays and lesbians could study elsewhere if they were unwilling to sign the Covenant.
Section 5, below, argues that today this reasoning is likely to be rejected by the Supreme Court of
Canada given contemporary legal and social norms.
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III. TWU does not welcome sexual minorities
Representatives of TWU have repeatedly claimed that gay and lesbian
students are welcome at their institution.60 This suggestion defies logic. Not
only are prospective students required to sign a covenant promising not to
engage in same-sex sexual intimacy under any circumstances, but they are
also required to police each other for any breaches of this promise.61 The
Covenant makes every member of the TWU community complicit in its
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The failure on the part of
this institution to grasp the violation of dignity—the impact of requiring a
gay or lesbian student to sign this agreement—speaks volumes about the
institutional environment in which this proposed law school is to operate.
TWU has asserted that there is nothing offensive or inimical to
Canadian society contained in the Covenant.62 This failure to apprehend
the profound shift in Canadian societal values in the last several decades
also raises concerns regarding the institutional environment in which law
students at TWU will be educated.63 TWU prohibits gay sex. Perhaps such
a prohibition would not have been offensive to a Canadian society that
criminalized anal and oral sex between men,64 that designated convicted
“homosexuals” as dangerous offenders sanctioned with indefinite
preventative detention,65 or that spied on, interrogated, and expunged from
public service thousands of individuals suspected of homosexuality in the
1950s and 1960s.66 In Canadian society today an institutional prohibition
on gay sex is offensive. Far more importantly, approval by a public
60. See, e.g., Letter from Bob Kuhn, President of TWU, to Rene Gallant, NSBS President (23 April
2014), online: NSBS <http://nsbs.org/twu-submissions>; Allison Jones, “Ontario law society votes
against accrediting graduates of BC university with ‘abhorrent’ gay sex ban” Canadian Press (24 April
2014), online: National Post <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/04/24/b-c-christian-university-thatbans-gay-sex-asking-ontario-lawyers-to-accredit-new-law-school/>.
61. Community Covenant, supra note 11.
62. See, e.g., Letter from Vice-Provost Kevin Sawatsky, TWU, to the Federation of Law Societies of
Canada (17 May 2013) in SAC Report, supra note 16 at 14; See also oral submissions of Bob Kuhn
to the NSBS: Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, “TWU Hearing” (4 March 2014), online: NSBS <http://
nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-03-04_NSBSTrinityWesternU.pdf.pdf> at
page 25.
63. Dianne Pothier describes this failure in the following way: “TWU can argue that, in accordance
with their religious beliefs, they are entitled to give offense because sexual intimacy outside marriage
between a man and a woman is immoral according to their interpretation of the bible. But to claim
no offense accepts no accountability for the position they take, and shows a fundamental lack of
understanding of equality principles by failing to come even remotely close to appreciating the
perspective of those excluded.” Dianne Pothier, “An Argument Against Accreditation of Trinity
Western University’s Proposed Law School” (2014) 23:1 Constitutional Forum 1 at 2.
64. Criminal Code, SC 1953-54, c 51, s 149.
65. See R v Klippert, [1967] SCR 822, 65 DLR (2d) 698.
66. See Gary Kinsman & Patrizia Gentile, The Canadian War on Queers: National Security as
Sexual Regulation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) at 3.
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regulator of an institutionalized prohibition on same-sex sexual intimacy
is inimical to a Canadian society that has taken significant legal strides
to overcome its appalling and tragic historical legal treatment of sexual
minorities.67
TWU has also asserted that there is no evidence that Christians at TWU
hide homophobia or hostility to gays and lesbians in Christian values.68
As a matter of common sense, a ban on gay and lesbian sex does seem
indicative of hostility towards gays and lesbians. However, setting that
aside, there is some other evidence of homophobia at TWU. In addition to
the affidavit of a former TWU student who experienced the university as
oppressively intolerant of her sexuality,69 consider the comments of TWU’s
Director of Residence in 201370 asserting the need to “help…a person with
same-sex attraction [to] disassociate with a ‘gay’ identity….”71 He asserts
that “we should not be content with someone remaining…in a life long
place of identifying themselves as ‘gay.’”72 He describes his efforts to help
gay men realize that their same-sex attraction is “a struggle rather than an
inherent part” of them.73 He states that in his role as Director of Residence
of TWU his hope is to challenge a student’s perspective that he must be
resigned to the fact that he is gay.74 According to the Director of Residence

67. See, e.g., Criminal Law Amendment Act, SC 1968-89, c 38 (repealing sodomy provision);
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 SCR 698 (affirming that federal legislation
recognizing same-sex marriage is constitutionally valid, both in relation to the division of powers and
the Charter); R v Tran, 2010 SCC 58, 326 DLR (4th) 1 (rejecting the homosexual panic defence); Egan
v Canada, supra note 45 (recognizing sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination).
68. See Letter from John Sawatsky to the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (17 May 2013) in
SAC Report, supra note 16 at 13.
69. See, e.g., the Affidavit of Jill Bishop, filed in Loke v Minister of Advanced Education of British
Columbia, British Columbia Supreme Court (9 April 2014), online: Ruby Shiller Chan Hassan Barristers
<http://www.rubyshiller.com/court-documents/Loke%20v.%20Minister%20-%20Affidavit%20
of%20Jill%20Bishop.pdf> (stating that some of her professors condemned homosexuality, none of
them condoned it, and that because of her sexual orientation she found the “TWU environment very
oppressive.”) Obviously, the evidence of one former student is not conclusive. However, it is not
accurate for TWU to assert that there is no evidence of homophobia at TWU.
70. Trinity Western University, Community Life, online: TWU <http://twu.ca/life/community/staff.
html> (archive on file with author).
71. The Director of Residence made these comments in a public discussion board on the Evangelical
Free Church of Canada (EFCC) website. Evangelical Free Church of Canada [EFCC], “Gay and
Christian” (9 April 2013), online: EFCC <http://www.efccm.ca/wordpress/gay-and-christian/>
(archive on file with author) [EFCC]. TWU was founded by the EFCC and considers itself “an arm” of
the Church. See Trinity Western University, “About TWU” (nd), online: TWU < http://twu.ca/about/>.
72. EFCC, ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
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at TWU, a failure on his part to address this “unhealthy identity” would
be negligent.75
Following a 2009 report from the American Psychological Association
indicating evidence of the harms caused by therapies aimed at changing an
individual’s same-sex sexual orientation,76 the state of California enacted
a law prohibiting mental health providers from engaging in “sexual
orientation change efforts” with patients under the age of 18.77 The types
of harms identified in the APA Report include depression, increased
suicidality and anxiety.78 The APA also noted recent studies concluding that
individuals subject to religious efforts to change their sexual orientation
reported experiencing similar harms.79 In Canada and the United States,
LGBTQ youth are significantly more likely than their straight counterparts
to suffer depression and attempt suicide.80 The Director of Residence of
TWU, presumably a position with significant student contact, asserts that
while acting in that capacity he would be negligent if he did not try to
change the “unhealthy” sexual orientation of his gay students.81 He bases
this perspective on his Christian values.82
A school that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy under any
circumstances and employs in a student services capacity a Director of
Residence publicly committed to using that role to convert students that are
“struggling with a gay identity” can hardly be characterized as welcoming
to members of the LGBTQ community. As noted in the previous section,
even the Federation concluded that gay and lesbian students would not feel
welcome at TWU.83 Unfortunately, the Federation also stated that to its

75. Ibid. TWU would likely respond that efforts aimed at reorienting the unhealthy sexual identity of
its gay students is done politely and with Christian love. Politeness is not a defence to discrimination
and anti-gay actions do not become less homophobic because they are grounded in religious belief.
76. American Psychological Association [APA], Report of the APA Task Force on Appropriate
Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation (2009), online: APA <http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/
resources/therapeutic-response.pdf> [APA Report].
77. US, SB 1172, Sexual Orientation Change Efforts, 2011–2012, Reg Sess, Cal, 2012. In Pickup v
Brown (2013) the 9th US Circuit Court of Appeal rejected a constitutional challenge to the law. Pickup
v Brown, 728 F (3d) 1042 (9th Cir 2013).
78. APA Report, supra note 76.
79. Ibid.
80. See, e.g., Egale, Canada Human Rights Trust, “Canada’s LGBTQ Youth At Greater Risk Of
Suicide Than Straight Youth” (27 September 2013), online: Egale <http://egale.ca/all/press-releaseysps-recommendations/>; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
and Transgender Health” (nd), online: CDC <http://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/youth.htm>; Rainbow
Health Ontario, “LGBT Youth Suicide Fact Sheet” (nd), online: Rainbow Health Ontario <http://www.
rainbowhealthontario.ca/admin/contentEngine/contentDocuments/LGBT_Youth_Suicide_.pdf>.
81. EFCC, supra note 71.
82. Ibid.
83. SAC Report, supra note 16 at para 36.
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knowledge TWU does not limit or ban LGBT individuals.84 This assertion
by the Federation was unexplained. Its report reveals no independent
research by the Federation to explore whether limits or bans are, in fact,
imposed on LGBT individuals. Presumably, the Federation’s reasoning
relies on drawing a distinction between prohibiting same-sex sexual
activity (which it says would make LGBT students feel “unwelcome”)
and explicitly prohibiting LGBTQ students.85
IV. A code of conduct that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy excludes
gays and lesbians
In Whatcott v. Saskatchewan the Supreme Court of Canada specifically
rejected the argument that there is any legal significance to the distinction
TWU draws between prohibiting same-sex sexual intimacy and prohibiting
gays and lesbians.86 In rejecting the argument that a legally significant
distinction can be drawn between discriminating against homosexual
behavior and discriminating against homosexuals, the Court stated:
Courts have thus recognized that there is a strong connection between
sexual orientation and sexual conduct. Where the conduct targeted by
speech is a crucial aspect of the identity of a vulnerable group, attacks on
this conduct stand as a proxy for attacks on the group itself.87

The Court in Whatcott uses the example of TWU’s covenant to
make this point. In fact, in rejecting the distinction between same-sex
sexual activity and same-sex identity, the Court draws its authority from
L’Heureux-Dube J.’s dissenting decision in BCCT. In BCCT, L’HeureuxDubé J. concluded that TWU’s covenant was discriminatory and that it
was acceptable for the College of Teachers to refuse accreditation of the
TWU program as a result. The unanimous Court in Whatcott states with
approval:
L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Trinity Western University v. British Columbia
College of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, in dissent
(though not on this point), emphasized this linkage, at para. 69:
I am dismayed that at various points in the history of this case the argument
has been made that one can separate condemnation of the ‘sexual sin’
of ‘homosexual behaviour’ from intolerance of those with homosexual
or bisexual orientations. This position alleges that one can love the
sinner, but condemn the sin. ... The status/conduct or identity/practice

84. Ibid at para 36.
85. Ibid at para 36.
86. Whatcott v Saskatchewan, 2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 SCR 467 [Whatcott].
87. Ibid at para 124.
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distinction for homosexuals and bisexuals should be soundly rejected,
as per Madam Justice Rowles: ‘Human rights law states that certain
practices cannot be separated from identity, such that condemnation of
the practice is a condemnation of the person’ (para. 228). She added that
‘the kind of tolerance that is required [by equality] is not so impoverished
as to include a general acceptance of all people but condemnation of the
traits of certain people’ (para. 230)….[I]t is [not] possible to condemn a
practice so central to the identity of a protected and vulnerable minority
without thereby discriminating against its members and affronting their
human dignity and personhood.88

Despite its discussion of, and reliance on, Whatcott, the Federation’s SAC
Report makes no reference to the Court’s explicit approval of L’HeureuxDubé J.’s conclusion that the discriminatory effect of TWU’s Covenant is
not ameliorated simply because its prohibition is aimed at sexual conduct
rather than sexual identity.89 Not only is the Federation’s SAC Report
silent on this important aspect of Whatcott, but even more problematically
it invokes exactly the love the sinner, hate the sin reasoning rejected by the
Court in Whatcott.90
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, a policy that requires
students to promise not to engage in same-sex intimacy is an attack on the
“human dignity and personhood” of gays and lesbians.91 In submissions to
the LSUC, TWU argued that this interpretation of Whatcott is too broad
and that Whatcott’s rejection of the act/identity distinction should not
apply to an assessment of TWU’s Community Covenant.92 This assertion
is without merit.93 The Supreme Court of Canada in Whatcott specifically
used TWU’s argument about its Community Covenant as an example of
the affront to human dignity perpetuated by reliance on this fallacious
distinction. The Federation, and those member law societies that have
decided to adopt the Federation’s recommendation, should have done
better than to embrace the formalistic and impoverished view of equality
so recently rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Whatcott.94

88. Ibid at para 123.
89. SAC Report, supra note 16 at 27.
90. Ibid.
91. Whatcott, supra note 86 at para 123.
92. Reply Submission of TWU to LSUC: Law Society of Upper Canada (22 April 2014), online:
LSUC at paras 71, 126 <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/twu/#twusubmission>.
93. It is true that the Court notes that sexual orientation and sexual behavior can be differentiated
for certain purposes (Whatcott, supra note 86 at 122), but to suggest that the Court was referring to
distinctions like the one drawn in support of TWU’s Covenant is implausible. TWU’s Covenant is
precisely the example the Court selected to exemplify this problematic argument, and in doing so it
quoted at length from L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s strongly worded decision on this issue.
94. Whatcott, supra note 86 at 122.
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V. The majority decision in BCCT is not dispositive
In 2001 the Supreme Court of Canada refused to uphold a decision by the
British Columbia College of Teachers denying an application by TWU
for a fully accredited teacher education program.95 The College declined
an application to fully accredit TWU on the basis that it was not in the
public interest to approve a teacher program from an institution that
discriminated against gays and lesbians. The College was concerned that
TWU graduates who entered public schools in British Columbia might
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court found that: (1)
homosexuals could go to teacher’s college elsewhere, (2) the College had
provided no evidence that TWU graduates would discriminate, and (3)
there was no basis to infer that the College’s purpose of requiring TWU
students to complete a fifth year at a separate university was aimed at
addressing issues of equality and discrimination.96 As a result, the Court
concluded that the College had not properly balanced freedom of religion
and equality.97 Many proponents of approval of TWU’s proposed law
degree have argued that the Court’s decision in BCCT should be dispositive
of the decision faced by law societies today.98 However, changing legal
and social conceptions of equality, different justifications for denying
accreditation to TWU’s law school, and a distinguishable factual context
suggest that the decision in BCCT is not determinative.
Social and legal conceptions of equality on the basis of sexual orientation
have progressed over the past 14 years
Many of the Benchers of the Law Society of British Columbia made
submissions during that body’s deliberations on whether to approve
TWU’s proposed law degree that followed an almost formulaic pattern.99
They opened their submissions with a strongly worded condemnation of
TWU’s discriminatory practices followed by an assertion, in reference to
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in BCCT, that the law is the law
and they are bound to follow the law.100
In his closing comments before the Law Society of British Columbia,
Bencher and constitutional lawyer, Joe Arvay told the LSBC (which has
95. BCCT, supra note 13.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. See Laskin Opinion, in SAC Report, supra note 16; Gomery Opinion, supra note 23; Jamal
Opinion, supra note 23.
99. Law Society of British Columbia, Bencher Meeting Transcript (11 April 2014), online: LSBC
<http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-transcript.pdf>.
100. Ibid. See, e.g., the oral submissions of David Mossop, QC (20:12); Miriam Kresivo, QC (at
22:4); Dean Lawton (at 24:2); Elizabeth Rowbotham (at 29:25); and David Crossin, QC (at 36:23).
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now been compelled by its own membership to reverse its decision to
approve TWU):101
I am…troubled by the very many comments to the effect that the
Community Covenant is repugnant, it’s hurtful, it’s discriminatory,
it’s hypocritical, it’s heartless, but we’re bound by the law.…I don’t
recognize a law that is so divorced from justice….We are the law-making
body charged with making the decision at hand. So long as that decision
is a reasonable one and [one] that reflects both the objects of our statute
and the Charter values we are bound to embrace, it will be a law that the
Supreme Court of Canada respects. The law is never frozen in time. It
is always evolving….I urge you…to reconsider your decision and make
sure that the law that you are applying is a just law.102

In “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School” I argued that
the legal analysis engaged in today to reconcile Charter rights would
differ from that of the BCCT decision in 2001.103 This is not because the
Court has rejected the internal balancing approach to resolving tensions
between Charter rights and values employed in BCCT. This is what some
proponents of approval have suggested was my argument in support of
the assertion that the Court’s approach in 2014 will have shifted from
the approach taken in 2001.104 Rather, my argument is that the context in
which this balancing would be done has changed. Legal recognition of
the equality interests of sexual minorities is more thorough today than it
was in 2001.105 Equal protection for gays and lesbians has been achieved

101. LSBC Resolution, supra note 18.
102. See oral submissions of Joe Arvay: Law Society of British Columbia, “Bencher Meeting
Transcript” (11 April 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWUtranscript.pdf> at pages 46-47. See also the oral submissions of Bencher Sharon Matthews, ibid at
page 32.
103. Elaine Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU Law School,” supra note 22. Others have since made
the same argument. See, e.g., the submissions of the Advocates’ Society (Letter from the Advocates’
Society to Thomas Conway, Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada) (29 March 2014), online:
LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/TWUTheAdvocates’SocietyMarch28.pdf>; The Sexual
Orientation and Gender Conference [SOGIC] of the Canadian Bar Association (Letter from SOGIC
to the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (18 March 2013), online: FLSC <http://www.flsc.ca/_
documents/TWUCdnBarAssnMarch182013.pdf>); and Benchers of the law societies in both British
Columbia and Ontario (See oral submissions of Joe Arvay, supra note 102; oral submissions of John
Campion, “Bencher Meeting Transcript” (24 April 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
uploadedFiles/ConvocationTranscriptApr102014TWU.pdf> page 144).
104. See SAC Report, supra note 16 at paras 27-29; Gomery Opinion, supra note 23; Laskin Opinion
in SAC Report, supra note 16.
105. See, e.g., Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10, 278 DLR (4th) 385 [Hislop];
R v Tran, supra note 67; Halpern v Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 65 OR (3d) 161 [Halpern];
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 67; Whatcott, supra note 86.

TWU Law: A Reply to Proponents of Approval

641

gradually as social, legal and political norms have shifted to become more
accepting of sexual minorities.106
Proponents of approval have argued that “it is doubtful…that this
evolution of social values would lead to a different outcome today from
that in BCCT.”107 This argument does not address the important claim that,
as a result of evolving social values, legal recognition of equality on the
basis of sexual orientation has increased since 2001 and that this increased
legal recognition of what constitutes equality for gays and lesbians shifts
the balancing process. While the values of freedom of religion continue to
be recognized today, as they were in 2001,108 recognition (both social and
legal) of the value of equality for gays and lesbians has increased since
2001. An increased legal understanding of what constitutes equality on
the basis of sexual orientation is likely to produce different conclusions
regarding what constitutes a reasonable balance between equality for gays
and lesbians and freedom of religion.
Consider the following example. In 1993 the Ontario Court of Appeal
rejected the claim that excluding same-sex couples from legal marriage
constituted a violation of section 15 of the Charter.109 They did so in part
on the basis that including same-sex couples in the institution of marriage
did not comport with the traditional Christian understanding of marriage
as the union of one man and one woman as defined in Hyde v. Hyde.110 The
majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the claimants were
seeking to use section 15 of the Charter to change this Christian definition
of marriage and that the Charter could not have that effect.111
Ten years later the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that
[t]he definition of marriage in Canada, for all of the nation’s 136 years,
has been based on the classic formulation of Lord Penzance in Hyde

106. Hislop, ibid; Elaine Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School,” supra note
22.
107. Laskin Opinion in SAC Report, supra note 16.
108. In the past several years the Court has refined its constitutional recognition of freedom of
religion. In Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 SCR 567 [Hutterian Brethren]
the majority recognized that in a multi-cultural, diverse Canadian society law makers and regulators
will unavoidably place limits/costs on religious adherents when pursuing the public good.
109. Layland v Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations) (1993), 14 OR (3d) 658
[Layland].
110. In arriving at its conclusion to uphold the common-law definition of marriage first articulated
in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1886), LR 1 P & D 130, the Ontario Court of Appeal quoted at
para 5 with approval: “The position or status of ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ is a recognized one throughout
Christendom: the laws of all Christian nations throw about that status a variety of legal incidents
during the lives of the parties, and induce definite rights upon their offspring. What, then, is the nature
of this institution as understood in Christendom.”
111. Layland, supra note 109 at para 20.
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v. Hyde….The central question in this appeal is whether the exclusion
of same-sex couples from this common law definition of marriage
breaches…the…Charter.112

The majority declared that the “one man and one woman” Christian
definition of marriage violated section 15 of the Charter by excluding
same-sex couples.113 What happened in the intervening period between
these two Ontario Court of Appeal decisions? The Supreme Court of
Canada recognized increased protection for the equality interests of gays
and lesbians under section 15 of the Charter in two landmark cases, Egan
v. Canada114 and M. v. H.115
It is certainly true, as suggested by some proponents of approval of
TWU, that in Whatcott the “Supreme Court has ‘reaffirmed its commitment
to an analytical approach that balances equality rights against other rights
protected under the Charter, giving appropriate weight to each.’”116 But
consider that between 1993 and 2003, in balancing the equality interests
motivating the pursuit of same-sex marriage with religious and social
beliefs about the Christian definition of marriage, the “appropriate weight”
attributed to equality for gays and lesbians increased. As a result, the same
Court, within a ten-year span, arrived at very different conclusions on
the same question.117 The point is that the “appropriate weight” attributed
to the values or interests to be balanced will fundamentally inform the
outcome of the balancing analysis. It matters what you put on each end of
the teeter-totter.

112. Halpern, supra note 105 at 1.
113. Ibid.
114. Egan v Canada, supra note 45 (recognizing that sexual orientation is a prohibited ground of
discrimination under section 15.) Note that in Layland the Ontario Court of Appeal also recognized
that section 15 protected sexual orientation. Therefore, the distinction between Layland and Halpern
cannot be explained by arguing that in 1993, pre-Egan, the Ontario Court of Appeal simply did not
recognize sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination.
115. M&H, supra note 45 (recognizing that excluding same-sex couples from the benefits offered to
heterosexual common-law couples promoted the view that they were less worthy and contributed to
their social erasure).
116. Gomery Opinion, supra note 23. See also the submissions to the LSBC from the UBC Faculty
of Law student working group on freedom of religion: Law Society of British Columbia, “TWU
Submissions” (2 March 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWUsubmissions.pdf> at page 58.
117. This is not to concede that a Court today in reviewing a law society decision not to approve
TWU’s law degree program would be adjudicating on the same issue. In fact, as noted in section 5,
there are compelling arguments to suggest that the issue facing law societies today can be distinguished
from the issue confronting the Court in BCCT. See Pothier, supra note 63.
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Contrary to the suggestions of some proponents of approval,118
Whatcott does not contradict, or even speak to, this point. In fact, Whatcott
offers an additional example of the way in which the Supreme Court of
Canada has increased the degree of protection against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation recognized under the Charter. More to the
point, it offers this example precisely in the context of TWU’s Community
Covenant. As noted above, Whatcott’s reliance on L’Heuruex-Dubé J.’s
dissent in BCCT established that when balancing freedom of religion
with the impact on equality interests perpetuated by TWU’s covenant,
the fact that the Covenant bans gay sex rather than gay individuals is
not relevant.119 This is a shift from the majority’s approach in BCCT. In
characterizing the implications of TWU’s covenant, the majority in BCCT,
unlike L’Heureux-Dubé J., appear to have placed some significance on the
distinction between condemning sexual practices and condemning sexual
minorities.120 In Whatcott the Court clearly adopted L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s
approach on this issue. Why? Likely because in the intervening years
between these two cases the Court developed a more informed and richer
understanding of the dignity interests compromised by a code of conduct
that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy.
Decisions regarding approval of TWU’s program for public purposes
must balance freedom of religion and equality for gays and lesbians based
on 2014 legal norms and social values, not those of nearly 15 years ago.
Legal recognition of the equality interests of sexual minorities in Canada
has expanded significantly. In 2001 the Court in BCCT concluded that
an appropriate balance was struck because gays and lesbians could go
elsewhere to become teachers (an argument that some proponents of

118. Laskin Opinion in SAC Report, supra note 16; Law Society of British Columbia, “TWU
Material” (8 May 2013), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-material.
pdf> at page 9.
119. Whatcott, supra note 86.
120. BCCT, supra note 13 at 22:
[The Court of Appeal] pointed out that the TWU documents make no reference to
homosexuals or to sexual orientation, but only to practices that the particular student is
asked to give up himself, or herself, while at TWU. These practices include drunkenness,
profanity, harassment, dishonesty, abortion, the occult and sexual sins of a heterosexual
and homosexual nature. There is no evidence before this Court that anyone has been
denied admission because of refusal to sign the document or was expelled because of
non-adherence to it.
While it is not clear from this paragraph how much significance the majority in BCCT placed on
the act/identity distinction, it does read as if the distinction was given some weight and the majority
certainly does not reject the distinction as did Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in BCCT and the unanimous
court in Whatcott.
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approval also make today regarding prospective gay law students).121 In
2014 it is likely not sufficiently cognizant of gay and lesbian equality
simply to say “TWU is not for everybody”122 and in the interests of
religious liberty the gays can go elsewhere to become lawyers.
The basis for denying accreditation to TWU’s law school is different than
in BCCT
Some proponents of approval have asserted that the grounds I suggested
for refusing TWU’s application should be rejected because “Professor
Craig provides no evidence to support the contention that” TWU law
graduates would discriminate against gays and lesbians.123 According to
them, BCCT established that it would be unreasonable for a professional
regulator to refuse approval of a professional program at TWU without
concrete evidence that TWU graduates would discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation.124
The grounds for rejecting TWU that I advanced in “The Case
for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School” were not based on the
assumption or suggestion that hypothetical TWU law graduates would
discriminate.125 In BCCT the College of Teachers justified its refusal to
accredit TWU because of a concern that its graduates would engage in
discriminatory conduct as public school teachers.126 The College did
not offer any evidence to support that concern. Whether reviewed on a
standard of correctness or reasonableness the College’s decision would
probably have been overturned. However, for proponents of approval to
argue that, as a result of the reasoning in BCCT, any decision to refuse
institutional approval to TWU must be backed by empirical evidence of
discrimination by TWU graduates is an example of the tail wagging the
dog. It does not appear that the decision to refuse accreditation was based

121. See Laskin Opinion in SAC Report, supra note 16. See also Newman, supra note 57 at 6.
The argument that gays and lesbians are not forced to attend TWU employs the same problematic
reasoning that has been soundly rejected with respect to other prohibited grounds of discrimination.
In 1940, in the name of freedom of commerce, and because the tavern was a private business, the
Supreme Court of Canada found that it was not contrary to good morals or public order for a bar owner
to refuse to serve African Canadians (Christie v York, [1940] SCR 139). Imagine someone making that
claim in 2014.
122. BCCT, supra note 13 at 25.
123. SAC Report, supra note 16; Laskin Opinion in SAC Report, supra note 16; Gomery Opinion,
supra note 23; Jamal Opinion, supra note 23.
124. Laskin Opinion, supra note 16; Gomery Opinion, supra note 23.
125. Elaine Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School,” supra note 22.
126. BCCT, supra note 13.
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on a concern that TWU law graduates would discriminate.127 Evidence of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation likely would be required
if it were. However, it does not make sense to assess the NSBS and LSUC
decisions based on whether there was evidence to support a concern that
does not appear to have formed the basis of their decisions.
BCCT can be distinguished on its facts

The context of TWU’s application for certification of its teacher training
program was quite different than the context of its request for accreditation
of a TWU law school. In “An Argument Against Accreditation of the Trinity
Western University’s Proposed Law School” Dianne Pothier identifies
three important factors that distinguish BCCT from the decision of law
societies on whether to accredit TWU’s proposed law degree.128 First,
unlike with respect to its law degree, TWU had a history of prior approval
of its teacher training program.129 When TWU made its application for
certification of its teacher training program it already had approval from
the College for an education degree in which the first four years occurred at
TWU followed by a fifth year at Simon Fraser. The application was simply
to move the fifth year from Simon Fraser to TWU. Second, in BCCT the
majority emphasized that there was no evidence to suggest that the College’s
requirement that TWU students complete a fifth year at Simon Fraser was
related to concerns regarding the Community Covenant. Unlike the Simon
Fraser program, which did not include an anti-discrimination component,
law schools are required to teach legal principles of equality.130 Refusal to
accredit based on a concern regarding the institutional capacity to deliver a
human rights and equality curriculum was not considered in BCCT. Third,
lawyers are involved in the interpretation and administration of equality
and anti-discrimination provisions under human rights legislation and
the constitution.131 This extra level of responsibility, borne uniquely by

127. Neither the LSUC nor the NSBS provided written reasons for their decisions. However,
neither the transcripts of the Ontario debates (<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/twu/>) the Memorandum
drafted by the Executive Committee of the NSBS (<http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/
CouncilMaterials/2014-04-16_TWUMemoCouncil.pdf>), nor the press releases issued by either
Society (available at <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/twu/> and <http://nsbs.org/news/2014/04/council-votesoption-c-trinity-western-university-law-school-decision>) indicate that their reasons not to approve
related to a concern that TWU law graduates would discriminate. Indeed, many of the Ontario
Benchers specified very clearly that their concern was with offering approval at an institutional level.
128. Pothier, supra note 63.
129. Ibid at 5.
130. Ibid; BCCT, supra note 13.
131. Pothier, supra note 63.
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lawyers, distinguishes BCCT from the issues at stake in the decision to
accredit a TWU law school.132
VI. Opposition to TWU’s law school should not be dismissed as antiChristian
Some supporters of approval of TWU’s law degree have mischaracterized
concerns regarding this specific institution’s policies as arguments opposed
to the notion of teaching from a Christian worldview. The Federation’s
SAC Report, for example, depicted the opposition to TWU as, in part,
based on an assertion that “TWU’s Christian worldview and intention
to teach from this perspective makes it incapable of effectively teaching
legal ethics, constitutional and human rights law.”133 The Federation also
implied that challenges to TWU’s institutional capacity to teach legal
ethics and human rights and equality law amounted to a claim about the
ethics and competence of all Christian lawyers and judges.134
The deficiencies with TWU’s proposed program do not flow from
its Christian worldview or intention to teach from that perspective.
Presumably, many ethical members of the profession share with TWU
a Christian worldview. Faith-based universities are not, simply by
virtue of their Christian mandate, incapable of teaching critical thinking
skills or equality and human rights. Many worthy and highly esteemed
educational institutions, such as St Francis Xavier, Trinity College at the
University of Toronto, and Notre Dame in the United States, have a faithbased tradition. The distinction, and it is an important one, is that these
institutions do not impose formal policies that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation or mandate a statement of faith that is inconsistent with
creating an institutional environment consistent with some aspects of the
requirements that the law societies have arrived at in accrediting Canadian
common law degrees.
In “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School” I argued that
the specific institutional policies of this particular university, as articulated
in its Community Covenant and Statement of Faith, are inconsistent with
some of the criteria for approval identified by law societies in Canada. The
Federation itself recognized concerns regarding TWU’s capacity to teach
ethics and public law, given the Community Covenant:

132. Ibid at 5.
133. SAC Report, supra note 16 at page 11.
134. The Federation’s SAC report, ibid, in concluding that the argument that TWU’s Christian
worldview means that students will fail to acquire the necessary critical thinking skills is without
merit, notes that many current members of the profession and the judiciary share this Christian
worldview and that there is no evidence that they are unable to think critically or act ethically.
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[T]he members of the Approval Committee see a tension between the
proposed teaching of these required competencies and elements of
the Community Covenant. In particular, the Approval Committee is
concerned that some of the underlying beliefs reflected in the Community
Covenant, which members of faculty are required to embrace as a
condition of employment, may constrain the appropriate teaching
and thus the required understanding of equality rights and the ethical
obligation not to discriminate against any person….135

A Christian worldview may be entirely consistent with critical thinking or
instruction on human rights and equality. However, the specific institutional
policies of this particular university, as articulated in its Community
Covenant and Statement of Faith, are inconsistent with the ethical duty
not to discriminate.136 Concepts of equality and non-discrimination cannot
properly be taught in a learning environment created by an institution with
policies that are explicitly discriminatory and that mandate discriminatory
beliefs.137
Consider the affidavit evidence of one former TWU student (submitted
in support of an ongoing constitutional challenge to the decision of the
British Columbia government to accredit TWU’s proposed law degree):
The Community Covenant is a part of the TWU culture and reflects that
culture….The effect of this was that people did not give opinions in class
discussions that did not align with those values. Another effect was that
professors carefully avoided expressing opinions that did not align with
the Covenant and TWU’s values….Some professors would condemn
homosexual activity, and none would condone….In discussion groups,
gay and lesbian issues came up frequently, but people were very unlikely
to raise opinions that were contrary to the covenant’s disavowal of sex
outside of marriage and relationships between same-sex couples.138

It obscures the institutionalized deficiencies in TWU’s proposed program
to cast arguments opposed to approval as an attack on all Christian based
educational instruction.
In a similar vein, proponents of approval have based some of their
arguments on the potential contribution of a Christian law school.139 The
135. FLSC Final Report, supra note 16 at paras 50 & 52. It should be noted that “the Approval
Committee concluded that the issue of whether students will acquire the necessary competencies in
both Ethics and Professionalism, and Public Law is, at this stage, a concern, rather than a deficiency.”
136. See Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School,” supra note 22.
137. Ibid.
138. Affidavit of Jill Bishop, supra note 69 at paras 16, 17, 19.
139. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 57 (responding to the arguments I advanced in “The Case for
Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School,” supra note 22); Laskin Opinion in SAC Report, supra note
16; Letter from Walter W Kubitz, QC, to the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (30 January
2013), online: FLSC <http://www.flsc.ca/_documents/TWUKubitzJan302012.pdf>.
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claim is that a Christian law school would offer a unique contribution to
legal education in Canada that is not currently available. It rests in part
on an affirmation of the worth of Christian educational institutions and
scholarship.140 This assertion, in as much as it was offered to respond to my
argument, is misdirected. Opposition to approval of TWU on the basis that
its Community Covenant discriminates, and that its mandatory Statement
of Faith does not facilitate open engagement with some issues, does not
impugn, or even speak to, the important scholarly contributions made by
religiously based law schools or the desirability of offering an accredited
non-secular legal education in Canada.141
VII. The decisions of the LSUC and the NSBS not to approve TWU were
reasonable
On 24 April 2014 the Law Society of Upper Canada decided not to
approve TWU’s proposed law degree for purposes of entry to the legal
profession in Ontario.142 On 25 April 2014 the Nova Scotia Barristers’
Society decided not to approve TWU’s proposed law school unless the
institution exempts law students from signing the Community Covenant
or amends the Community Covenant for law students in a way that
removes its discriminatory aspects.143 In both Ontario and Nova Scotia
these decisions were arrived at through lengthy, transparent processes
that involved public consultation, oral and written submissions by TWU,
members of the profession, public, and legal academy, and open debate
among the voting and non-voting members of each governing body.144

140. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 57 at 2: “Although it has gone largely undiscussed…, there is
in fact a significant scholarly literature in the United States on the contribution offered by religious
law schools.” He offers examples such as Christian legal scholarship that explores the origins of the
concept of rule of law.
141. For example, Newman, ibid at 2, emphasizes that Cardozo Law School (which is based in a
Jewish University) is well respected. He then concedes: “although Cardozo itself is certainly open to
a diverse group of students.” He does not return to this very important distinction between Cardozo
and TWU—Cardozo’s code of conduct does not exclude certain groups (Benjamin N Cardozo School
of Law, “Student Affirmation: Disciplinary Code, Rules And Procedures”), online: Cardozo Law
<http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/2014_Student_Affirmation.pdf>. TWU’s Community
Covenant excludes certain groups.
142. Law Society of Upper Canada, “Treasurer’s Statement Regarding Vote On TWU Law School”
(nd), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/newsarchives.aspx?id=2147485737&cid=2147498273>.
143. See Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, “Council Votes for Option C in Trinity Western University
Law School Decision” (April 2014), online: NSBS <http://nsbs.org/news/2014/04/council-votesoption-c-trinity-western-university-law-school-decision>.
144. Law Society of Upper Canada, “TWU Accreditation” (nd), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.
on.ca/twu> and Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, “TWU Public Input” (nd), online: NSBS <http://nsbs.
org/twu-public-input>.
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As noted in the introduction, TWU has commenced legal proceedings
in each province.145 In its 2012 decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec
the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that decisions like the ones made
by the LSUC and the NSBS should receive deference by reviewing
courts.146 Not only were these expert decision-makers applying their home
statutes (a decision-making function that will be reviewed on a standard of
reasonableness),147 but in exercising their discretion in this capacity they
were required to consider and balance competing Charter values (which
the Court in Doré confirmed will also receive deference). On review, the
central question that will be asked of the NSBS and the LSUC is whether
these law societies, in advancing the public mandate stipulated under their
enabling statues, properly balanced the competing values at stake. Did
they secure a proportionate balance between their statutory objectives and
these competing Charter values?148 Again, this question is to be pursued
by a reviewing court in a manner reflective of deference—that is to say, on
a standard of reasonableness.149
In deciding whether to approve TWU’s proposed law degree, the
LSUC and the NSBS were required to balance freedom of religion and
equality. Several factors suggest that the decisions of the LSBC and the
NSBS were reasonable in light of their statutory obligations to regulate in
the public interest in their respective provinces.
First, it is reasonable for a law society to conclude that in the context
of delivering an accredited legal education, the right to act on a belief in
the sinfulness of same-sex intimacy is narrower than the right to believe
that same-sex intimacy is sinful. The constitutional guarantee of freedom
of religion offers a spectrum of protections.150 In its application to the
government of British Columbia for authority to confer law degrees, TWU
emphasized the secular nature of its proposed law school.151 TWU’s own
description of its proposed law degree program emphasizes the secular
145. See Trinity Western University, “Trinity Western Takes Legal Action to Defend Religious
Freedom” (2014), online TWU <http://www.twu.ca/news/2014/028-twu-takes-legal-action.html>.
146. 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 [Doré].
147. See, e.g., Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at 54, [2008] 1 SCR 190.
148. Doré, supra note 146.
149. I am grateful to my colleague Sheila Wildeman for helpful discussions on this point. See
also Letter from Sheila Wildeman to Rene Gallant, President, NSBS (10 February 2014), online:
NSBS <http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-02-10_Wildeman_TWU.pdf>
(discussing these administrative law principles).
150. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 108 at 95; Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004]
2 SCR 551.
151. For a discussion of the secular nature of TWU’s program see Letter from Kathleen Lahey to Policy
Secretariat, online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/TWULahey,KathleenMarch28.pdf>
28 March 2014.
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nature of the activity at issue—providing an accredited legal education.152
The limit imposed by the NSBS and LSUC decisions pertains to conduct
(imposition of a mandatory code of conduct) rather than belief, and places
a limit on an activity (provision of a fully accredited law degree program)
that TWU itself has framed in secular terms.
The question faced by the LSUC and the NSBS was not: Do we
approve of TWU’s beliefs? The NSBS and the LSUC determined that
they were unable to offer institutional approval to TWU because of the
institution’s discriminatory practices.153 The NSBS voted to approve TWU
conditional on it removing the discriminatory aspects of the Covenant. The
NSBS also made it clear that its decision not to grant conditional approval
was with respect to the institution. It does not create an absolute bar to the
practice of law in Nova Scotia for future TWU law graduates. The issue
facing the NSBS and the LSUC related specifically to the public approval
or accreditation of an institution that excludes same-sex minorities. As
was emphasized by Nova Scotia Council members and Ontario Benchers,
TWU and its graduates are free to believe and preach whatever they choose
regarding the immorality of same-sex intimacy.154 In terms of practices,
they are free to pursue the study of law. They are free to educate lawyers
who can gain entry to the legal profession through channels other than
attendance at an accredited institution.155 They are certainly free to abstain
from engaging in practices involving same-sex sexual intimacy. Freedom
of religion should protect these practices. However, freedom of religion is
not absolute. Some limits on religious rights are reasonable—particuarly
those that impose costs on religious practitioners rather than compel certain
beliefs or deny meaningful choice: “The Charter guarantees freedom of
152. Ibid.
153. TWU argues that these law societies have not been asked to accredit its law degree but only its
graduates. This argument is not compelling. The regulations and bylaws in both Ontario and Nova
Scotia clearly contemplate approval at an institutional level. See By-Law 4, s 7 made pursuant to s
62(0.1) of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, C L.8; Regulations made pursuant to Legal Profession Act,
SNS 2004, c 28 s 3.1.
154. See Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society “Memorandum from Executive Committee to NSBS Council”
(16 April 2014), online: NSBS <http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/CouncilMaterials/2014-04-16_
TWUMemoCouncil.pdf> at page 17 [Memo to NSBS]: “TWU is allowed to believe, practice,
promote and value its religious beliefs—but by requiring prospective students to execute a contract
that contains discriminatory statements and by threatening discipline in the event of violation of the
contract, TWU exceeds the bounds of protected religious freedom.” This memorandum was prepared
by the Executive Committee of the NSBS for the Council of the NSBS. It identified three options for
the Council without endorsing any of them. Option A involved a vote to approve. Option B involved
a vote not to approve. Option C, which was adopted by the Council, involved approval conditional on
TWU removing the discriminatory aspects of the Community Covenant. See also the oral submissions
of Bencher John Campion, supra note 103.
155. See Memo to NSBS, ibid.
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religion, but does not indemnify practitioners against all costs incident to
the practice of religion.”156 Imposing costs “on the religious practictioner
in terms of money, tradition or inconveinance” does not preclude choice
as to religious belief or practice.157 In a diverse and multi-cultural society
such costs will often be reasonable, particularly, as in this case, where
the cost relates to an “inability to access conditional benefits or privileges
conferred by law….”158 Conferral of an accredited law degree is a
privilege. In Ontario and Nova Scotia, the cost to a religious organization
of delivering a legal education through an institution with discriminatory
policies is lack of law society accreditation for the institution. This is not
a serious infringement on religious freedom.159 The NSBS and LSUC
decisions represent a measured and proportionate balance between
freedom of religion and protection of equality.
Second, it is reasonable for a law society to question whether
fundamental aspects of an accredited Canadian legal education, such
as an understanding of equality rights and the ethical obligation not to
discriminate, can be adequately taught in a setting of institutionalized
discrimination.160 In making its decision the LSUC had before it a report
from the Approval Committee of the Federation indicating concerns
that “the underlying beliefs reflected in the Community Covenant…may
constrain the appropriate teaching and thus the required understanding
of equality rights and the ethical obligation not to discriminate against
any person.”161 As noted in the previous section, unlike the teacher
training program at issue in BCCT, law schools are required to teach legal
principles of equality under the Constitution and human rights legislation.
TWU did not offer the Federation or the LSUC any explanation as to how
it would address these concerns.162 The Federation’s Approval Committee,
in making its recommendation, chose to rely on bare assurances from
156. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 108 at para 95.
157. Ibid at paras 94, 95.
158. Ibid at para 95.
159. Ibid at 94, 95.
160. See Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School,” supra note 22.
161. FLSC Final Report, supra note 16 at paras 50 & 52. This was a report written subsequent to the
Approval Committee receiving the report of the SAC. The NSBS also had the Approval Committee’s
report. Given the explanation of Option C in the Memorandum from the Executive to NSBS Council,
supra note 154, the concern about this tension may not have factored into the NSBS decision. The
opening paragraph of the Option C description states: ‘Council accepts the Report of the Federation
Approval Committee that, subject to the concerns and comments noted, the TWU program will meet
the national requirement.”
162. See Pothier, supra note 63 at 3: “In its submissions…TWU said only that key cases on sexual
orientation equality would be taught, and standard texts relied upon….The real question is not what
will be taught, but how it will be taught.”
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TWU that it would address these concerns. However, it was certainly
open to, and reasonable of, the LSUC not to accept these simple assertions
from TWU. In the face of admissions and hiring policies that explicitly
discriminate, and a report from the committee charged with reviewing the
program expressing concerns regarding the school’s ability to properly
teach equality and human rights in such a context, it is reasonable for
a professional regulator to refuse to accredit without more than bare
assurances of how these concerns would be addressed.
Third, in exercising their statutory mandates to regulate in the public
interest it is necessary for the NSBS and the LSUC to consider whether
TWU’s hiring and admissions policies are inconsistent with human rights
legislation in Nova Scotia and Ontario.163 In BCCT the Court suggested
that TWU’s policies would be exempt under British Columbia’s human
rights legislation.164 The Court in BCCT only addressed the British
Columbia human rights regime and in fact only did so indirectly. It did
not actually consider the potential discriminatory impact of the code of
conduct on TWU students or staff.165 In “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s
Proposed Law School” I argued that the majority of provinces do not
have religious exemption clauses identical to the one found in the British
Columbia legislation and that it was incumbent upon regulators of the
legal profession to consider whether TWU’s policies would be unlawful
in their province.166 Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act does not create
an exception for the student admissions policies of religiously based
university programs.167 It was reasonable for the NSBS to premise approval
163. In Tranchemontagne v Ontario (Directors, Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC 14, [2006] 1
SCR 513 [Tranchemontagne], the Supreme Court of Canada decided that administrative tribunals are
required to interpret and apply human rights legislation because it is fundamental, quasi-constitutional
law. While it is true that Tranchemontagne concerned an adjudicative decision-maker and direct
application of the human rights legislation, it is equally desirable that discretionary administrative
decision-makers such as the law societies make decisions that are consistent with fundamental,
quasi-constitutional laws. In other words, even if they are not legally required to apply human rights
legislation, it is certainly reasonable for them to make decisions in light of, and consistent with, the
values and principles adopted by these fundamental laws.
164. BCCT, supra note 13 at 25. Whether section 41 of the British Columbia Human Rights Code
applies to every aspect of TWU was not before the Court in BCCT.
165. Ibid.
166. Supra note 22 at 156.
167. RSNS 1989, c 214. Under Nova Scotia’s Act the religious exemption is limited to employment
relationships. It cannot be applied to exempt religiously based discriminatory student admissions
policies. In addition, TWU could not reasonably argue that abstinence from same-sex sexual
intimacy is a bona fide qualification for attending law school. See also the Nova Scotia Human Rights
Commission legal opinion to the NSBS concluding that the TWU Covenant would violate human
rights legislation in Nova Scotia: Letter from the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission to the
NSBS (10 February 2014), online: NSBS at para 21 <http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_
Submissions/2014-02-10_NSHC_TWU.pdf>.
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of TWU’s law degree on the condition that it remove from its Community
Covenant those aspects that are inconsistent with Nova Scotia’s human
rights legislation.168 A decision of this nature reflects a just, reasonable and
proportionate balance between freedom of religion and equality.
TWU has contested the applicability of Nova Scotia’s human rights
legislation, arguing that reliance on Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act is
precluded by principles of extra-territoriality.169 There are significant flaws
with TWU’s reasoning on this point. The primary authority that TWU
relies on for its assertion is an Ontario Human Rights Tribunal decision
that supports a conclusion opposite to TWU’s position. In Cohen v. Law
School Admission Council the Tribunal concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction regarding a complaint arising from a decision by Dalhousie
University not to admit the complainant to Dalhousie’s law school.170
The claim stemmed from an allegation that the Law School Admission
Council denied accommodation of his disability with respect to the writing
of the Law School Admission Test in Ontario. The complainant alleged
that Dalhousie University discriminated against him by denying him entry
based on his LSAT score even though the university knew he had not been
accommodated. The Tribunal concluded that the claimant’s allegation
against Dalhousie lacked a sufficient connection to Ontario. Although the
alleged failure to accommodate occurred in Ontario, the decision not to
admit Cohen occurred in Nova Scotia. The Ontario legislation could not
be applied to Dalhousie University’s admissions decision. The applicable
legislation was Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act. Cohen is a (non-binding)
authority for the proposition that Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act applies
to a decision-maker in Nova Scotia with respect to discriminatory acts
occurring in another province by someone else, upon which the Nova
Scotia decision-maker relies. Cohen is similar to the circumstances
surrounding the NSBS decision and supports the NSBS’s reliance on, or
consideration of, Nova Scotia’s human rights legislation. The other nonbinding authorities relied on by TWU simply illustrate the uncontroversial
fact that provincial statutes cannot apply to matters that have no connection
to the enacting province.171 They do not support TWU’s position. Simply
168. See Memo to NSBS, supra note 154.
169. Letter from Bob Kuhn, President of TWU, to Rene Gallant, President of the NSBS (23 April
2014), online: <http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-04-23_Kuhn_TWU.
pdf>.
170. (2014) HRTO 537.
171. For example, TWU relies on Hughes v 507417 Ontario Inc, 2010 HRTO 1791, [2010] OHRTD
No 1794, in which the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction over
a matter in which the employer was outside of Ontario, the employee lived and worked outside of
Ontario, and the alleged incidents of discrimination occurred outside of Ontario.
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put, a decision of the Nova Scotia law society on whether to accredit a law
degree program for purposes of admission to the legal profession in Nova
Scotia is a matter connected to the province of Nova Scotia. “The alleged
discrimination may be occurring in British Columbia, but it becomes a
concern for the Law Society here in…[Nova Scotia or Ontario] because
the accreditation is taking place in this province.”172
Moreover, TWU’s argument fails on its own logic. It is true that
according to the principle of extra-territoriality Nova Scotia’s Human
Rights Act is not applicable to the actions of TWU in British Columbia,
but neither is British Columbia’s human rights legislation, and more
specifically its exemption purportedly rendering TWU’s discrimination
lawful in British Columbia, applicable to a decision of the NSBS in Nova
Scotia. What is applicable to the decision of the NSBS is Nova Scotia’s
Human Rights Act, and under this legislation it would appear that TWU’s
policy is unlawful. The fact that the Covenant would constitute unlawful
discrimination if TWU were situated in Nova Scotia should be considered
by the NSBS in its deliberations as to whether approval of the TWU law
degree is in the public interest of Nova Scotia. Human rights legislation
is quasi-constitutional.173 It “must be recognized as being the law of the
people….”174 As a matter of democratic principle the NSBS should not
be bound by a statutory exemption that may make TWU’s policy lawful
discrimination in British Columbia, but that was not adopted by the
people’s elected lawmakers in Nova Scotia. Administrative decisionmakers should exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with the
values and principles reflected in the human rights legislation to which
they are bound.175 Again, it is reasonable for the NSBS not to accredit
an extra-provincial institution in Nova Scotia for Nova Scotia purposes
based on a conclusion that its policies are contrary to the human rights
values adopted in Nova Scotia. Similarly, it would be reasonable for the
LSUC not to approve a proposed law degree from an institution if the

172. Pinto Opinion, supra note 23 at 3 and 4.
173. Tranchemontagne, supra note 163 at 33.
174. Ibid.
175. For an analysis demonstrating that the exemptions under Nova Scotia’s human rights legislation
would not apply to a TWU law school, see Letter from the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission to
the NSBS, supra note 167.
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LSUC concluded that the institution’s policies conflict with the values and
principles reflected in Ontario’s human rights legislation.176
Lastly on this point, the failure of Nova Scotia (or Ontario) to provide
religious organizations with the same exemption purportedly offered
in British Columbia is not an unjustifiable violation of section 2 of the
Charter.177 Nova Scotia does accommodate religious organizations by
including an exemption under its human rights legislation for some forms
of religiously motivated discrimination in employment practices.178 The
exemption does not apply to student admissions policies. Even if this
narrower exemption found under Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act was
found to be a prima facie violation of section 2 of the Charter, it would
almost certainly be upheld as a reasonable, well-tailored, and minimally
impairing infringement under section 1 of the Charter.179
Fourth, it is reasonable for a law society to conclude that public
accreditation by the legal profession of an institution that excludes sexual
minorities will further stigmatize a historically disadvantaged minority
and have a significant adverse effect on the social status of gays and
lesbians.180 It is reasonable to conclude that it is in the public interest to
place a limit on religiously based discriminatory actions in an effort to
avoid this adverse effect on the social status of sexual minorities. This
argument was not advanced in BCCT.181 The Supreme Court of Canada
in Whatcott, albeit in the context of considering the constitutionality of
prohibitions on hate speech against sexual minorities, concluded that in
176. In making its decision, the LSUC had before it a legal opinion (Pinto opinion, supra note 23)
highlighting a leading human rights case in Ontario in which an Evangelical Christian organization
that operated group homes in Ontario was not entitled to impose upon a lesbian support worker a
religiously based code of conduct that prohibited same-sex intimacy. According to the Divisional
Court in Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Christian Horizons, 2010 ONSC 2105, 319 DLR
(4th) 477, the organization could not avail itself of the exemption offered under the Code because a
ban on same-sex relationships was not sufficiently connected to the employee’s duties.
177. TWU raises this argument in its submissions to LSUC: Reply Submission of TWU to LSUC:
Law Society of Upper Canada, “TWU Submissions” (22 April 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.
on.ca/twu/#twusubmission>.
178. Human Rights Act, supra note 167.
179. A fully developed Charter analysis is beyond the scope of this article. Some of the factors
that indicate that a prima facie violation would be upheld under section 1 include the following:
The infringement on religious freedom relates to a limit on (discriminatory) actions not beliefs. It is
narrowly tailored so as to allow religious organizations to discriminate in some contexts—such as
employment. There are other avenues through which TWU graduates could become members of the
NSBS. In conducting a justification analysis under section 1, a court would consider both the limit
on religious freedom and the harmful effect on others. A broader exemption would have a significant
adverse effect on others.
180. Systemic discrimination of this nature was considered by the NSBS: “the systemic discrimination
of the institution is what must be addressed and rejected.” Memo to the NSBS, supra note 154 at page
18.
181. BCCT, supra note 13.
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assessing the reasonableness of a limit on section 2 of the Charter, proof
of actual harm may not be either possible or required.182 The reasoning in
Whatcott demonstrates the Court’s recognition of the inherent difficulty of
proving the harmful effects on sexual minorities of some discriminatory
practices. In other words, Whatcott reveals the Court’s willingness to take
into account the evidentiary challenges of proving systemic discrimination
when balancing competing Charter values.183 The Court held that the
discriminatory effects of hate speech are common knowledge and that it
was reasonable for the legislature to assume that hate speech against sexual
minorities will diminish their social standing, stigmatize sexual minority
identities and perpetuate harm to the dignity and equality interests of
sexual minorities.184 This is not to equate the hate speech engaged in by the
respondent in Whatcott with TWU’s exclusionary policy.185 Rather, it is to
note that the Court in Whatcott concluded that it is reasonable for decisionmakers to draw common sense inferences about the relationship between
stigma and systemic discrimination. The impugned conduct does not need
to rise to the level of harm to social status at issue in Whatcott in order to
182. Whatcott, supra note 86 at HN: “The difficulty of establishing causality and the seriousness of
the harm to vulnerable groups justifies the imposition of preventive measures that do not require proof
of actual harm. The discriminatory effects of hate speech are part of the everyday knowledge and
experience of Canadians. As such, the legislature is entitled to a reasonable apprehension of societal
harm as a result of hate speech.”
183. The Court had previously recognized the evidentiary challenges to proving the systemic
discrimination perpetuated by hate speech (see R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697). Whatcott is the first
time they recognized this in the context of equality for sexual minorities.
184. Whatcott, supra note 86.
185. TWU has argued that “[t]he attempt of opponents to link TWU with the behaviour of Mr.
Whatcott is offensive.” According to TWU’s written submissions to the LSUC expressing hate
towards any person is “directly contrary to TWU’s religious values….” TWU, Reply Submissions
to LSUC (22 April 2014), online: LUSC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/TWUsubmissionreplytoLSUC.pdf> at para 72. TWU’s indignation at being linked to Whatcott, and its assertion
that the type of expression engaged in by Bill Whatcott is contrary to religious belief at TWU, are
surprising. TWU was founded by the Evangelical Free Churches of Canada and America. Today,
TWU describes itself as “an arm” of the church. See TWU, “About TWU: Fact Sheet,” online:
TWU <https://twu.ca/about/fact-sheet.html>. The EFFC intervened in Whatcott in order to support
Bill Whatcott’s right to engage in hateful expression. See EFFC, “Factum of the Intervener,” online:
<http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/whatcott>. The EFFC, of which TWU is an arm, argued that
evangelical Christians sincerely believe that they are compelled to share the tenets of their faith with
the community even when their beliefs are offensive (note that the Court in Whatcott found, at para
57, that the speech the EFCC was defending went well beyond offensive). The EFCC did not condone
the words chosen by Bill Whatcott. However, not only did the church argue for his right to use them
in order to convey his homophobic messages, it argued that for evangelical Christians conveying
beliefs that may be offensive to the public is part of their religion. Also of note, in its submissions to
the LSUC, TWU stated that in Whatcott, in the context of hate speech, the Court rightly rejected the
distinction between targeting behaviour and targeting sexual identity. This is certainly not what the
EFCC, of which TWU is an arm, argued in Whatcott. Indeed, the EFFC factum, ibid, beginning at
para 30, contains an entire section defending the distinction they draw between sexual act and sexual
identity.
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rely on Whatcott’s conclusion that the difficulty of establishing causality
in the context of systemic discrimination justifies placing some limits on
religious and expressive freedom even in the absence of specific proof.
Moreover, it may be that the social status of sexual minorities is actually
placed in greater jeopardy by the public accreditation of a law school
that excludes gays and lesbians than by the homophobic ranting of one
individual. The expressive effect of accreditation by the legal profession is
much more difficult to recognize and ignore than is the anti-gay religious
expression of one man.
The question that should be posed post-Whatcott is the following: is
it a matter of common knowledge that accreditation by a state authorized
public actor of a law school that excludes gays and lesbians would
affect the “social status and acceptance in the eyes of the majority” of
this vulnerable group?186 It is reasonable for law societies to consider the
impact on the public interest effected by offering law society imprimatur
to an institution that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.187
Consider an analogy to an institution with a religiously based behavioural
code that prohibits sexual intimacy except that between one man and
one woman of the same race. Even without concrete evidence of harm, it
would be reasonable for a law society to conclude that public accreditation
of such an institution would further stigmatize racialized groups in
Canada.188 On the same basis, it is reasonable for the LSUC and the NSBS
to conclude that accrediting an institution that prohibits same-sex sexual
intimacy would stigmatize and lower the social status of gays and lesbians
in Ontario and Nova Scotia. Whatcott supports this reasoning.
Conclusion
TWU has a Community Covenant that only permits gays and lesbians
to attend at considerable personal cost to their dignity and sense of selfworth.189 TWU has a non-discrimination policy that covers race, colour,
national or ethnic origin, age, sex, marital or family status, pardoned
convictions, and physical or mental disabilities but does not cover sexual
orientation.190 In assessing this university’s commitment to equality for
186. Whatcott, supra note 86 at 80.
187. See Jamal Opinion, supra note 23.
188. The Association of Chinese Canadian Lawyers of Ontario draws this same analogy: “This
covenant tells prospective students that if they are queer, they can only attend TWU if they deny their
sexual identity—or lie about their sexual behaviour at the risk of expulsion if they get caught. This
is no more acceptable than a covenant that excluded students of Chinese descent.” Letter from the
Association of Chinese Canadian Lawyers of Ontario to Jim Varra, Director of Policy, LSUC, supra
note 38 at 2.
189. BCCT, supra note 13.
190. “Employment Opportunities,” supra note 32.
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sexual minorities, these institutional actions should be given considerably
more weight than that given to the university’s bare assertions proclaiming
a commitment to the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.191
Law societies in British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan should
consider whether they would have approved TWU’s law degree if its policy
prohibited sexual intimacy except that which occurs within the sanctity of
marriage between a man and woman of the same race. Similarly, would
the Federation have recommended giving a stamp of approval to a law
school that prohibits inter-racial couples?
The analogy is direct and apt.192 Bob Jones University, an American
post-secondary institution, did precisely this and did so on the grounds of

191. See Letter from TWU President Raymond to Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note
31, claiming that TWU respects the equality rights of gays and lesbians.
192. During public deliberations by the Benchers of the LSBC, Lynal Doerksen argued that this
comparison is “neither direct nor apt” for three reasons: (1) the belief that interracial marriage is
wrong is offensive in and of itself (unlike the belief that same-sex marriage is wrong), (2) the belief
that marriage is only meant to be between people of the same race is not a tenet of the majority or
any of the world’s major religions, and (3) the belief that marriage is between a man and a woman
is explicitly condoned in Canadian law under the Civil Marriage Act. See Law Society of British
Columbia, “Bencher Meeting” (11 April 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/
newsroom/TWU-transcript.pdf> at 13:20. Doerksen’s submissions reveal a misunderstanding of
constitutional law and the significance of the preamble to the Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33,
as well as unfounded empirical assertions. First, while the belief that same-sex marriage is wrong
is clearly not offensive to Doerkson, one might well question whether it is in fact offensive to many
people. More importantly, the offensiveness of either of these beliefs is entirely irrelevant to the
aptness of the analogy or the decision on whether to approve TWU’s proposed law degree. Second,
the history of religiously supported anti-miscegenation laws across many parts of the United States
prior to the 1967 decision in Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967), combined with a rich academic
literature examining these laws (see, e.g., Fay Botham, Almighty God Created the Races: Christianity,
Interracial Marriage, & American Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009)) belies
Doerksen’s unsupported claim that opposition to interracial marriage was not founded on the beliefs
of Christian religions. Third, he is simply wrong to assert that the Civil Marriage Act, ibid, condones
any particular belief about the definition of marriage. The preamble to the Civil Marriage Act affirms
the uncontentious point that nothing in that Act affects the guarantee of freedom of conscience and
religion to hold, declare, and publicly express diverse views on marriage. Section 3.1 of the Act,
which is superfluous, clarifies once again that the Charter protects freedom from discrimination on
the basis of religion and freedom of religious belief, including the belief that marriage is the union of
one man and one woman. The freedoms enshrined under section 2 of the Charter (and highlighted
under the Civil Marriage Act) are equally protective of the right to hold and express beliefs—religious
or otherwise—about interracial marriage and same-sex marriage. Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 at s 2.
For an informed discussion of the ways in which analogies to race have served as useful tools
for the recognition of LGBTQ rights see Craig Konnoth, “Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy,
Gay Identity, and Gay Litigation in the 1950s−1970s (2009) 119 Yale LJ 316. For a discussion of
the challenges with relying on race-based analogies to advance sexual minority rights arguments see
Serena Mayeri, Reasoning from Race: Feminism, Law and the Civil Rights Revolution (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
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religious belief.193 The United States Internal Revenue Service revoked
Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt status on the basis that its policy
was contrary to public interest—a decision that was upheld by the
Supreme Court of the United States.194 Bob Jones University attempted
(unsuccessfully) to justify its prohibition of interracial sex on many of the
same grounds that TWU invokes to justify its prohibition on gay sex: that
it is a private university, that it has the right to its religious beliefs, and that
it permits racialized students to attend—it just requires that they comply
with a code of conduct consistent with the university’s religious beliefs.195
Law societies that have accredited TWU will have to accept that they
would either also approve a law school with an anti-miscegenation policy
or accept that they have made a decision founded on the conclusion that
gays and lesbians are not entitled to the same degree of respect, dignity
and equality that they would grant to others. There is no principled basis
upon which a law society could say yes to a religious covenant that says no
gay sex but no to a religious covenant that says no interracial sex.
Former Chief Justice Brian Dickson once observed that “the ethos of
the profession is set by the gatekeepers to legal education, namely those
involved in the admissions process.”196 Particularly, in light of the decision
to begin regulating legal education in Canada, law societies have become
a part of that admissions process.197 Drawing on a reference to the legal
profession of British Columbia’s particularly egregious historical record
of racism against Chinese Canadians, one Bencher of the LSUC suggested
that accrediting TWU’s program would be “a huge step backward in the
progress of human rights” in Canada.198 When legal historians write the
story of TWU’s proposed law degree and the controversy it has produced
the sentinels of the profession in Nova Scotia and Ontario will have played
a very different role than that played by the gatekeepers to the profession

193. Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574 (1983).
194. Ibid.
195. See, e.g., Bob Jones III interview with Larry King: CNN, “Larry King Live: Dr. Bob Jones III
Discusses the Controversy Swirling Around Bob Jones University” (3 March 2000), online: CNN
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/03/lkl.00.html>:
We see what the Bible says about this, so we say, OK, if they’re going to blend this world—
and inter-racial marriage is a genetic blending, which is a very definite sort of blending—
we said as—let’s put this policy in here, because we are against the one world church and,
way back, 17 years ago when I was on your program, I was saying on programs all across
America, we are not going to the Supreme Court fighting for our rule and our—we are
fighting for our right to it. There is a religious freedom issue, that’s all we ever fought for.”
196. Brian Dickson, “Legal Education” (1986) 64 Can Bar Rev 70.
197. See Craig, “The Case for Rejecting TWU’s Proposed Law School,” supra note 22 for an
explanation on why this is the case.
198. Oral submissions of LSUC Bencher Avvy Yao-Yao Go, supra note 10.
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in British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. Those law societies yet
to decide whether to accredit TWU’s proposed law degree might reflect
upon Kew Dock Yip’s magnificent contribution to the legal profession in
Canada and consider whether, in his story, they would rather have played
the part of British Columbia or Ontario.

